I address the interaction between accounting conservatism and real options in both a staged investment and abandonment model. An accounting policy biased towards classifying a Good (Bad) project as Bad (Good) is conservative (aggressive). The accounting signal is optimally conservative when the ex ante unconditional expected terminal value is less than the second investment (staged investment) or value of the asset in its alternative use (abandonment). The relative size of the second investment is a proxy for the degree of sequentiality of the project. Since research and development projects typically require more sequential investment than fixed assets projects, the staged investment results are consistent with the differential treatment of these types of investment under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
Introduction
I study how the bias in information affects investment in a real options framework. In particular, I derive conditions under which the optimal accounting information system has a conservative bias. I model two types of real options, staged investment and abandonment. In the staged investment model, the firm can adopt a project that requires sequential investment at two dates. The firm has sufficient capital to make only the first investment and seeks to sell the project to investors. If there are no investors willing to buy the project, the firm drops the project and it produces no cash flows. In the abandonment model, there is only one investment, but the assets have value in an alternative use. The firm sells the project to investors for exogenous liquidity reasons. If the signal is unfavorable, the investors abandon the project in favor of the assets alternative use.
Both models include a public accounting signal that arrives prior to the real option decision point. The signal is noisy and may misclassify projects. An accounting policy that frequently classifies a Good project as Bad (Type I error) but rarely classifies a Bad project as Good (Type II error) is conservative. Conversely, an accounting policy that frequently classifies a Bad project as Good but rarely classifies a Good project as Bad is aggressive.
The payoffs, investments, and alternative value (if applicable) are known to the regulator, who sets the accounting policy to maximize the expected surplus in the economy. Because there is no private information in the model, this is equivalent to maximizing the expected proceeds of the sale to the investors.
Increasing conservatism in the staged investment model has competing effects, increasing the price of the project conditional on a High signal, but reducing the probability that the High signal occurs. Higher conservatism, therefore, may not result in higher expected sales proceeds. The choice of optimal accounting policy depends on whether the second investment exceeds the unconditional ex ante expected terminal cash flow. If this is true, investing in Bad projects yields large losses. To make the sale more attractive to investors, it is necessary to set a conservative accounting policy that eliminates Type II errors. If the second investment is lower than the unconditional ex ante expected terminal cash flow, then the opportunity cost of abandoning a Good project is high, and an aggressive accounting policy is optimal.
The firm is sequentially rational. If the expected proceeds from the sale are less than the initial investment, the firm does not adopt the project. I establish parameter values for which the regulator optimally chooses a conservative accounting policy and the firm adopts the project. The main result of the paper is that this generally occurs when the second investment is a relatively large share of total investment, or, in other words, when the real option aspect of the investment is more important. I argue that this loosely conforms to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Research and development (R&D) projects typically require sequential investment, and the GAAP requirement of expensing R&D immediately rather than capitalizing is conservative. In contrast, investments in property, plant and equipment are typically less sequential, and the GAAP requirement of capitalization is aggressive.
The results are similar in the abandonment model. Because the project assets have value in an alternative use, the investors buy the project even if the signal realization is unfavorable.
In setting the accounting policy, the regulator trades off increasing conservatism to reduce the probability that Bad projects will be pursued with increasing aggressiveness to reduce the probability that Good projects will be abandoned. Conservative accounting dominates when the value of the assets in their alternative use exceeds the unconditional ex ante expected terminal cash flow. Otherwise, aggressive accounting dominates.
Prior research
There is a large body of empirical literature addressing conservatism in financial reporting. 1 Basu (1997) adopts a returns-based approach, arguing that conservatism implies that losses are recognized in earnings on a more timely basis than gains. He finds evidence that returns and earnings are more correlated for loss firms than for gain firms, consistent with conservatism. Penman and Zhang (2002) measure conservatism from a balance sheet perspective as the understatement of assets related to inventory, research and development, and advertising.
The theoretical conservatism literature is less developed. Watts (2003a) suggests that 1 For more references, see Watts (2003b) .
conservatism is related to debt contracts, and in particular may play a role in protecting debtholders against excessive dividend payments. Gjesdal and Antle (2001) model the interaction between income measurement and dividend covenants. Though conservatism may be optimal, the result derives from shareholders trading off cash flows in different periods, not from the need to protect the interests of creditors. Kwon, Newman and Suh (2001) study a limited-liability moral hazard setting. The principal in their model optimally selects a conservative accounting measurement system. The intuition is that the limited liability precludes large negative penalties. As a result, the conservative accounting system, because it increases likelihood ratios for higher outcome reports, is optimal. Gigler and Hemmer (2001) model a principal-agent setting in which the agent can make a voluntary disclosure prior to the noisy earnings report. The authors focus on the implications of conservative accounting rather than the choice of the optimal accounting policy. They find that the value of communication is strictly decreasing in the degree of conservatism in the reporting system. Venugopalan (2001) examines the role of conservatism in an adverse selection principalagent model. The properties of the accounting measurement system affect real investment levels as well as capital market prices. He examines both a contractual setting and a market setting. In the contractual setting, conservative accounting unambiguously induces more efficient investment. In the market setting, conservative accounting is more efficient only if it is also more informative. The relative informativeness of conservative and liberal accounting systems depends on the ex ante probability of success of the project.
My model is most similar to the market setting in Venugopalan (2001) , though there are important differences in both the modeling and the results. Venugopalan (2001) models an agency conflict without a real option. I model a real option without an agency conflict. The accounting signal in my model is useful because it provides guidance on whether to exercise the real option, not because it regulates a control problem between the current owners and investors. Venugopalan (2001) finds that conservative accounting is optimal in the market setting if the probability of success of the project is less than 1 2 , regardless of the magnitude of the payoff. I find that conservative accounting can be optimal only when the unconditional ex ante expected terminal cash flow is less than the second investment (value of the assets in their alternative use). That is, a combination of probability of success, magnitude of payoff and size of investment yields the optimality of the conservative accounting policy, not just probability of success alone.
The difference between the results follows from the underlying economics. In Venugopalan (2001), the market price depends on both the level of investment and the signal. The owner of the firm has incentive to overinvest to deceive the potential buyers about the value of the firm. By providing separate information about the firm's type, the accounting signal indirectly disciplines the investment. The signal's ability to discipline the overinvestment depends critically on its ability to differentiate between states. The payoffs to the states are not important. When the probability of project success is low, conservative accounting discriminates between states more effectively.
As there is no adverse selection problem in my model, the signal's only role is to inform the decision related to the real option. The informativeness of the signal plays a role, of course, but not independent of the payoffs of the states. In effect, the different states receive different weights. In the staged investment model, for example, the cost of investing in a Bad project is high if the ex ante expected payoff is less than the second investment. Hence, a conservative accounting signal in which the High signal is relatively precise is optimal. Conversely, if the ex ante expected payoff is higher than the second investment, the opportunity cost of abandoning a good project is high. The regulator prefers an aggressive accounting signal in which the Low signal is relatively precise.
In addition to the conservatism literature, there is also an extensive body of empirical research on the valuation consequences of abandonment options. Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) show empirical evidence consistent with investors using balance sheet information to abandon to price the option to abandon the firm at its exit value. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) demonstrate a nonlinear convex relation between market value and earnings consistent with investors valuing the adaptive use of a firm's assets as an option. Hayn (1995) argues that because assets have a liquidation value, losses will not perpetuate and finds, consistent with her hypothesis, that losses have a lower earnings response coefficient than gains. The abandonment option is sometimes offered as an alternative explanation for the returns-earnings regularities attributed to conservatism in Basu (1997) . My paper shows that disentangling the two explanations is difficult as the presence of real options has direct effects on the optimal level of conservatism.
In the theoretical accounting literature, Zhang (2000) embeds a real option within the Feltham and Ohlson (1996) model. The firm infers operating efficiency from accounting numbers and then determines whether to discontinue, maintain, or increase the scale of operations. In this setting, firm value can be a convex function of accounting variables. 
Staged Investment Model
The players in the model are a firm, investors and a regulator. All players are risk-neutral and have common information about the project and signal structure. The firm has a project that requires sequential investment at dates 1 and 2 in the amount of I 1 > 0 and I 2 > 0 respectively. It will be convenient at points in the analysis to refer to aggregate investment I = I 1 + I 2 and also to the proportion of aggregate investment that occurs in the first period
The project is Good with probability g and Bad with probability 1 − g. If both investments are made (project is funded), the terminal cash inflow for a Good project is distributed uniformly between V and V + ∆, with The signal most naturally relates to asset recognition. The outcome of the test determines the amounts that will be accrued or expensed, respectively. In the time that has elapsed between the investment and the signal, information has become available to the firm's managers and auditors allowing them to make an assessment of the project's future profitability. 5 This information is aggregated in the signal. varying the degree of conservatism in the accounting measurement system alters the quality of the investors' inference about the firm's type. As a result, conservatism has real effects in the models. In Feltham and Ohlson (1996) and Zhang (2002) , accounting conservatism has no effect on the inference investors make about the firm's earnings generation process.
Though there is a real option in Zhang (2002) , accounting conservatism, which takes the form of accounting depreciation accelerated relative to economic depreciation, has no effect on the firm's decision. The mechanics of the signal in my model are also consistent with the spirit of the Basu (1997) good news/bad news interpretation of conservatism. As accounting becomes more conservative in the model, it is less likely that good news about the underlying type of the project will be captured by the signal and therefore reflected in returns.
Investors use the signal to update their priors on project type. Define
as the updated probability that the project type is Good given a High signal, and define
1−c+gh as the updated probability that the project type is Good given a Low signal. Define V H (V L ) as the investor's expected payoff from the investment conditional on a High (Low) signal realization.
If the expected cash flow of a Low project is greater than I 2 , then the investors will buy the project regardless of the signal realization. In this case, neither the signal nor the real option has value. Since the purpose of the study is to examine the interaction between real options and signal properties, I restrict the parameter space to
, guaranteeing an economically meaningful decision problem at the second investment decision date.
I observe also that only Good projects can generate a High signal under conservative accounting. It is always possible, therefore, to set c such that the expected terminal cash flow given a High signal is greater than the second investment, and the expected terminal cash flow given a Low signal is less than the second investment. The preceding assumption and observation together imply that the regulator sets the accounting policy, c, to maximize the expected payoff conditional on a High signal. Formally, the regulator solves the following program:
where p SH is the probability of a high signal realization. If the firm adopts the project, it is funded by investors when the signal is high, which occurs with probability p SH . Otherwise, the initial investment I 1 is lost. The basic tension in this model is that increasing conservatism reduces the probability that the investors will buy the project but increases the price if they do. The first constraint is the sequentially rational firm's incentive compatibility constraint. If the expected proceeds from the sale of the project, p SH (V H − I 2 ), are not sufficient to cover the initial investment, the firm does not adopt the project. The second constraint is the investor's incentive compatibility constraint. Note that the regulator can affect the date 1 investment decision only by altering the distribution of expected sales proceeds at date 2 through its choice of c.
I fully characterize the parameter space for the staged investment model in the following proposition. I express the various thresholds in terms of α, the proportion of the investment that occurs at date 1. The parameter α is inversely related to the sequentiality of the investment, and therefore also inversely related to the potential value of the real option. 
v. The ratio of projects funded with conservative accounting to projects funded with aggressive accounting is
, decreasing in g, increasing in h, and independent of ∆.
All proofs in Appendix.
The first item in the proposition states that the optimal accounting policy depends on the relative sizes of the ex ante expected payoffV and the second investment. IfV > I 2 , the Good projects are so valuable that the regulator does not want to risk an information system that leads to any of them being dropped. An aggressive accounting policy achieves this. IfV < I 2 , the relatively low payoff from the project induces greater selectivity. To avoid the risk of Bad projects generating a High signal, which lowers investors' assessments of the expected payoff, the regulator optimally chooses a conservative accounting policy.
The first part of the proposition addresses only the optimal accounting policy; it does not provide conditions under which the firm rationally makes the first investment. Because aggressive accounting is optimal for projects with relatively high ex ante unconditional expected terminal cash flows, it is not surprising that there exist conditions under which the firm rationally adopts the project. Part ii of the Proposition establishes this result. Since conservative accounting is optimal for projects with relatively low ex ante expected cash flows, however, it is not obvious that these projects can ever have NPV > 0. Part iii establishes that there are conditions under which the regulator sets a conservative accounting policy and the firm adopts the project, the principal result of this section of the paper.
Part iv shows that increasing the variance of the terminal cash flows by increasing ∆ induces the firm to invest over more of the parameter space. Part v addresses the relative incidence of conservative and aggressive funded projects. Assuming that V and α are independently and uniformly distributed over the parameter space, part v shows that the relative incidence of conservatism is strictly decreasing in g, the probability that the project is Good, increasing in h, the precision of the High signal, but fixed with respect to ∆. Assuming the existence of suitable proxies for the parameters, part v potentially provides the basis for empirical tests of cross-sectional tests of relative conservatism.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the proposition. The horizontal axis is α, the share of total investment made at date 1 (I 1 /(I 1 + I 2 ). The vertical axis is V , the midpoint of the range of payoffs. There are four distinct regions in Figure 3a . The shaded region in the northeast corner is outside of the parameter space of the model. In this region, the second investment is less than the expected cash flows of a Bad project, implying that the signal is irrelevant and the real option has no value. In the large area starting in the southwest corner, the firm does not adopt the project in the first period because the expected proceeds from selling the project are lower than the initial investment. This can occur if either conservative (region VI) or aggressive (region V) accounting is optimal. Conservative accounting is optimal and investment occurs in the triangle labeled CON, defined by the V-axis, the line above which conservative accounting yields NPV > 0, and the line above which aggressive accounting dominates conservative accounting (regions I and II). In the remaining area (regions III and IV), the firm adopts the project and aggressive accounting is optimal.
In figure 3b, I illustrate the effect of increasing the variance of the project by increasing ∆.
Not surprisingly, the potential scope of the real option increases-the shaded region outside the parameter space shrinks because the ex ante expected cash flow from a Bad project is decreasing in ∆. Both the conservative and aggressive regions increase. Part v of the proposition states that both regions increase at the same rate.
For both high and low variance scenarios, conservative accounting tends to dominate for low α/low V combinations. The intuition is that if most of the investment takes place at date 2 and the potential gain is lower, even a low probability that a Bad project generates a High signal substantially reduces the investor's expected net payoff. A conservative accounting policy protects investors from Bad projects. Increasing α has two effects. First, since more of the investment occurs at the first date, the firm's expected proceeds from selling the project, must be higher to justify adoption of the project at date 1. Second, α increases the expected sale price by reducing the date 2 investment (fixing total I and V ). The firm's expected net profit increases at a higher rate for aggressive accounting as α increases. For low values of V , the increase in the firm's expected proceeds is not enough to offset the increase in I 1 and eventually it is not profitable to adopt the project. For higher values of V , the date 2 investment eventually becomes low enough relative to V that aggressive accounting dominates.
Casual empiricism suggests that the results are consistent with current Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). GAAP treats different forms of investment differently, requiring accrual for some and expensing for others. Research and development expenditures, for example, must in almost all cases be expensed in the period incurred, whereas investments in fixed assets are capitalized. R&D is typically a sequential process in which the firm frequently reassesses the economic viability of the project and decides whether to continue investment. In terms of the model, this is a low α project in which most of the aggregate investment occurs after the initial date, and expensing is a maximally conservative accounting policy. In contrast, most of the necessary investment in fixed assets occurs at the initial date. That is, it is a high α project, and capitalization is an aggressive accounting policy.
The intuition of the model also applies to the diversity within R&D rules. In particular, FAS 86 allows capitalization of software development costs after technology feasibility has been established. One can interpret the feasibility requirement as a sequence of High signals, after each of which the posterior probability that the project is Good increases. Part v of Proposition 1 shows that as the probability that the project is Good, g, increases, the relative incidence of conservative accounting declines. This suggests that in a more elaborate model, multiple sequential signals might exhibit a pattern of increasing aggressiveness. Indeed, an extension of the model to a second signal and third investment indicates that the second signal is optimally aggressive even if the first signal is conservative. 6 
Abandonment option
In this section, I eliminate the staged investment and incorporate an abandonment option.
The project requires a single investment of I at date 0. The project type, the probability structure for the terminal cash flows, and the probability structure for the signal are identical to the staged investment model. Because there is no second investment, I assume that the firm sells the project for liquidity reasons exogenous to the model.
The assets necessary to implement the project have value in an alternative use of V A .
There are three decisions with respect to the investment. First, the firm decides at date 0 whether to invest in the assets. Second, the firm decides at date 0 whether to use the assets in the project or in their alternative use. If the firm invests and pursues the project, investors always buy the project at date 1 at a price equal to the expected terminal cash flows conditional on the signal realization. The investors then decide at date 2 whether to continue with the project or abandon it (use the assets in their alternative use). See Figure   2b for the time line.
The regulator solves the following optimization problem: The results for both types of real option are comparable in some ways to Venugopalan (2001). In the market setting of Venugopalan (2001) , the manager has private information about the ex ante probability that the product is good (θ in his model and g in mine) and also chooses an investment level. 7 Investors price the firm based on an observation of investment and the realization of an accounting signal. Distortions in the equilibrium investment schedule and the informativeness of the accounting signal act as substitutes in disciplining the manager's investment choice. If θ < 1 2 , conservative accounting is optimal because it is more informative than aggressive accounting and therefore mitigates the equilibrium investment distortion. In Venugopalan (2001) , the dominance of conservatism hinges only on the ex ante probability of failure; the size of the expected payoff is irrelevant. In my paper, the dominance of conservatism hinges not only on the probability of failure but also on the relative sizes of the payoff and the follow-up investment (or abandonment value). Whereas in Venugopalan (2001) it is projects with absolutely low success rates that generate the need for conservative accounting, in my paper it is projects with low ex ante expected payoffs.
Fixing the success rate, it is possible to alter the size of the payoff to justify aggressive, rather than conservative, accounting. 
Conclusion
This study contributes to the understanding of accounting conservatism by demonstrating a link to real options. I present two different real option models. The first is a staged investment in which two investments are necessary to bring the project to fruition. The second is an abandonment model in which the project assets have value in an alternative use. In both models an accounting signal arrives before the last decision must be made.
The basic tension in the accounting system is that the accounting policy can reduce the rate of Type I errors (mislabeling a Good project as Bad and failing to sell or pursue) only by increasing the rate of Type II errors (mislabeling a Bad project as Good and failing to drop or abandon to its alternative use).
The results of both models are similar. If the unconditional ex ante expected terminal cash flow exceeds the amount of the second investment in the staged investment (value of the project assets is their alternative use in the abandonment model), the opportunity cost of failing to sell (abandoning) Good projects is the dominant force. As a result, the regulator chooses an aggressive accounting policy. Otherwise, it is the Type II errors that dominate, and the regulator sets a conservative accounting policy. The main implication of the paper is that in the staged investment model, conservative accounting is more likely to be the optimal policy when the proportion of the investment occurring at the second date, a proxy for the importance of the real option, is high. I argue that this is consistent with the expensing of R&D and the capitalization of fixed assets in that the former is more likely to entail sequential investment than the latter. Also, it is straightforward that extending the staged investment model to additional periods could explain a sequence of accounting signals in which the early ones are conservative and later aggressive, consistent with the capitalization of software after the establishment of technological feasibility.
There are limitations to the analysis. First, while the model potentially provides an explanation for the evolution of different accounting treatments for investment in R&D and fixed assets, respectively, it does not fully conform to institutional practice. In particular, with the exception of software capitalization, there is no possibility of a high signal under current GAAP treatment of R&D; the firm must expense all R&D expenditures regardless of its assessment of the ultimate viability of the project. Second, the model approaches conservatism from an information perspective-there is no mapping between signal realizations and the income statement and balance sheet. While this is consistent with most of the conservatism theory literature, the empirical literature typically adopts a measurement perspective.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions Proof of Proposition 1
Differentiating the objective function with respect to c yields I − αI + ∆( Substituting c = h into the objective function yields the NPV for aggressive accounting:
Setting equal to 0 and solving for α yields
, the condition in part ii of the proposition.
Substituting c = 1 into the objective function yields the NPV for conservative accounting: It is necessary to establish that the real option has value in the regions described by the above conditions. The relevant parameter restriction is α < 1 − , and aggressive accounting has area
. Taking the ratio yields the amount in part v. The derivatives are straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 2
The objective function is
Differentiating with respect to c yields ∆( . If accounting is aggressive, the NPV is
Setting this equal to 0 and solving for V yields If the firm adopted, the firm invests I 1 . The shaded region is outside the assumed parameter space.
